EXPOSURE, FROSTBITE, EXCEEDING ABILITIES—Maine, Mt. Katahdin. Toward the end of January 1974, Bob Proudman (25), Paul DiBello (23), Mike Cohen (30), Doug George (23), Page Dinsmore (19), and Tom Keddy (26) were in Baxter State Park for a winter attempt on Maine’s highest mountain.

The climbers arose Thursday morning, 31 January, had some breakfast, packed, and left the cabin around 9 a.m. They realized from their White Mountain experience that bad weather was on the way, but assumed they had 12 to 18 hours before a drastic weather change. All had double boots, wool pants, wind pants, gaiters, hats, wool shirts, and wind breakers. There was no plan to spend a night out, and no gear was carried for such an eventuality.

The two teams started up their respective gullies about 10 a.m. Bob Proudman led team number two with Mike Cohen and Doug George. Paul DiBello led rope number one with Page Dinsmore and Tom Keddy. Proudman’s rope found the going quite “straight forward,” making good progress, and stopped for a brief lunch around 2 p.m. Early in the climb his group could see the other party which was making slower progress due to more difficult climbing, but lost sight of them around midday.

Meanwhile, team number one found the going much slower. Conditions were mixed ice and snow with some difficult ice pitches requiring the use of ice screws and pitons. They did not pause, figuring that when they caught up with the others, a break for lunch could be called. Late in the afternoon this party was becoming noticeably tired. Proudman’s rope, meanwhile, had continued its steady progress, finding the climbing mixed snow and ice with some rock. Proudman became concerned about overall group progress, since dusk was not far off and the ridge was still not in sight. Just at dark, Proudman’s party made contact by voice with the others. They asked for Proudman’s party to wait since they had only one headlamp among them. They thought they would be “about 20 minutes.” Proudman thought that was too brief a period. In fact, it turned out to be about three hours before they joined up.

Proudman thought that they might be spending the night out, so he placed two rock pins and cut a platform in the snow. He tried to determine the route ahead by shining his light through the fog above, but to no avail.

All of a sudden, with no advance warning, the storm hit them with gale force winds and swirling snow. All six climbers huddled against the mountain. Cohen and George had just dropped a (150’) rope to Dinsmore. Dinsmore was leading the other rope still and was climbing directly behind George. Dinsmore, too, needed some assistance on the last 30 feet of the pitch. In short order, Cohen, DiBello, and Keddy reached what was to prove to be the bivouac site for the night. All three needed help from the rope on the last pitch, especially Keddy, who fell several times coming up to the bivouac. By this time, it was late evening, perhaps close to midnight.

All six huddled on a ledge about three by five feet. DiBello’s team was in poorer condition than the other, having found the going difficult in spots and making slower progress. Dinsmore feels that all three were feeling some effects of hypothermia. DiBello did not have his expedition parka and Keddy could not get his wind pants on; he had not been able to get his Dacron parka on alone. It took Proudman and one other half an hour to help Keddy don his parka.

As the night wore on, the group sang songs and huddled together attempting to keep warm. They did isometric exercises and rubbed each other’s backs, occasionally eating some more leftover food. The wind continued to howl, with gusts estimated at 100 mph, rarely lessening to 40 or 50, while the temperature was estimated at 25 degrees below zero. After huddling together for some time, they tried to get on their feet to assess their conditions. DiBello was unable to stand. They settled down again to pass away the remaining time before dawn.

As soon as it was light enough to see each other the morning of 1 February, each was appalled as he looked at his companions. All were suffering from frostbite. Dinsmore said that he had to leave immediately because he was freezing to death. Proudman states that this appeared to be a fact, and did not attempt to dissuade Dinsmore from leaving even though it meant attempting 5th class climbing with no security. Fortunately, the explosive wind was sweeping up the gully rendering assistance to anyone climbing. Cohen and Proudman immediately set about to free up some ropes so the rest could escape. Only one rope was freed.

Proudman said: “Our plan was for me to climb out 150 feet of this line and to wait while Cohen pulled and cut the longest stretch of rope he could find in the tangle. He would then tie this stretch onto the end of the line going to me. I could then climb out until the rope was again taut, at which time another stretch would be pulled out, cut by Mike, and tied onto my line. The plan was to repeat the process until we had a line attached to the ridge connecting it with the bivouac site. With this hand line we hoped we’d all be able to get off the technical stuff and onto the ridge.”

Proudman started slowly toward the ridge over the 60-degree slope. He realized his eyes must be frostbitten, but he could distinguish between rock, snow, and ice. He finally made it to the ridge and tied the rope securely. He started back down to the bivouac by rappel only to find the second rope had become untied and he had no connection with the rest of the group. The wind was still so strong he could not communicate with them and believed that he might not be able to locate the bivouac if he continued his descent. He made the decision to climb to the ridge and head down the mountain on the slight chance a rescue effort would be possible. He caught up with Dinsmore who was seeking shelter from the wind behind a boulder and they both descended the mountain together. At the Taylor Trail junction, they took the wrong turn, but were able to bushwhack to the Chimney Pond Trail by 2:30 p.m. Near Roaring Brook Camp, they found Ranger York’s personal snowmobile; Proudman sent Dinsmore on for help while he began the long climb back up the mountain. He soon met Ranger York who told him that Cohen and George had reached the camp at Chimney Pond. Proudman continued on to Chimney where he received first aid and was flown out in due time with the other two.

Cohen and George had realized that the rope arrangement was not going to work and that Proudman obviously had departed. They both had been trying to keep Keddy and DiBello warm; DiBello still could not stand, and Keddy’s condition had worsened to the extent he was semiconscious. About three hours after Proudman left, Cohen decided he and George should leave since they were no longer able to be of appreciable help to their companions. They made the two as comfortable as possible, then climbed to the ridge and made the descent to Chimney Pond, arriving at approximately 1:30 p.m. Ranger Arthur York and his wife were on hand at the cabin and immediately administered first aid, and radioed headquarters at Millinocket to report the situation. The rescue effort began.

A helicopter arrived at Millinocket at 2:55 p.m., was immediately dispatched to Roaring Brook Campground, delivered Dinsmore to the Millinocket Hospital, and returned under extremely adverse conditions. It picked up Proudman, Cohen, and George.

Back on the mountain, DiBello had revived to the extent that he realized his partner Keddy was helpless, slipping into unconsciousness from time to time and falling off the ledge. On four separate occasions, DiBello had to pull Keddy back onto the ledge and put him in a sitting position. He forced himself to stand on his frozen limbs and decided that he would try to get out. He made an effort to evacuate Keddy with the use of a small piece of spare rope, but he was unable to make any progress and had to leave Keddy at the bivouac site. He departed the site at approximately 3:30 p.m.

He made his way to the ridge and started to descend as darkness fell. He lost the trail and while bushwacking, fell off a cliff about 60 feet into the snow and trees.

His eyes were scratched by the trees and he was partially blinded. He lost his ice axe, but managed to make his way again to the ridge and down the mountain, groping his way to the Chimney Pond Campground, where first aid was administered.

Everyone involved with rescue efforts realized that the chances of Keddy’s being alive were quite remote by this time. Rescue units from the Maine Warden Service, Eastern Mountain Sports, and Appalachian Mountain Club arrived during the night at Millinocket. George Smith, the search leader, arrived at Chimney Pond around 10 p.m., and made the decision not to risk a night rescue attempt.

The next morning at 7:30, four rescue units moved out. A climbing team with Rick Wilcox and other climbers from Eastern Mountain Sports reached Tom Keddy’s body about 11:45 a.m. on 2 February. Winds and the low temperature prevented an evacuation until several days later.

DiBello was the most gravely injured of the five survivors, with badly frozen feet, subsequently losing one thumb, one foot and part of the other foot. In addition, he sustained varying degrees of frostbite on his face and hands. Most noses were discolored and swollen greatly, with ears, necks, cheeks, and eyes affected. Cohen’s toes were in bad condition and he was on crutches for several weeks. George had one hand in bad shape, while Dinsmore required some skin grafting on his fingers. Proudman was released to home, having sustained only minor injury.

Analysis: In our opinion, this accident has to be termed “preventable,” a preventable accident being defined as one in which the participants failed to do everything they could reasonably have done to prevent it. The questionable decisions which were made and which might have prevented the unfortunate events of 31 January and 1 February 1974, had they been different, are: 1) the decision to go ahead with the climb based on scanty weather information; 2) the decision to use two ropes of three climbers each, rather than a different arrangement; 3) the decision to leave the cabin on the morning of the climb at 0900, rather than one and one-half to two hours earlier; 4) the decision to include a climber of Tom Keddy’s limited experience; and 5) the decision not to carry bivouac sacks or some emergency gear for the contingency of being caught out overnight.

It is apparent that not all of the climbers were in proper physical condition for a climb of such length and severity; this, too, was another deficiency in the planning process.

Although the climbers maintain they came to Baxter State Park prepared to be totally independent, one wonders if that were wholly true. Perhaps subconsciously they became slightly careless due to the presence of Park Rangers, i.e., the total reliance on the Ranger on duty and “seat of the pants” feelings for weather information. Perhaps the use of the cabin gave a false sense of security not experienced when using mountain tents due to its relative proximity to the climbing routes. (Source: This is a precis of a thorough report by George Hamilton.)