Analysis of Sixty-Six Mountaineering Accidents, United States and Canada, Five-Year Period, 1974-1951

Publication Year: 1952.

ANALYSIS OF SIXTY-SIX MOUNTAINEERING ACCIDENTS, UNITED STATES AND CANADA

FIVE-YEAR PERIOD, 1947-1951

LOCALITY

Cascades, 13 accidents; Colorado Rockies, 12; Tetons, 11; Appalachian Mountains, 6; Yosemite Valley, 5; Sierra Nevada, 4; Canada (Rockies, Purcell Range,

Coast Range), 4; Olympics, 3; Arizona and New Mexico, 3; Practice cliffs (various localities), 3; Montana rockies, 1; Alaska, 1

TERRAIN

Rock, 39 accidents (including 18 accidents on difficult rock); snow, ice or crevassed area, 21; not known or not pertinent, 6

ASCENDING OR DESCENDING

Ascending, 17 accidents; descending, 31 (including 4 accidents in rappelling); not known or not pertinent,

18

IMMEDIATE CAUSE

Fall from rock, 21 accidents Slip on snow or ice, 13

Falling rock, 6 (including 3 in which rock was dislodged by a climber, and one

inpulling down the rope)

Loose rock, 5 (stepping on loose rock or pulling out handhold)

Loss of control in a voluntary glissade, 3 Failure of rappel rope, sling or point of rappel support, 3 Avalanche, 2 Fall into crevasse, 2 Lightning, 1

Other causes or cause unknown, 10

CONTRIBUTORY CAUSES AND CIRCUMSTANCES

Climbing unroped, 21 accidents Inadequate equipment, clothing or food, 14 Climbing alone, 6

Possible carelessness on unsound rock, 6 Climbing out of season, 5

Attempt to follow route clearly beyond party’s qualifications, 4

Darkness, 3

Failure to obey leader or heed companions, 3 Severe storm of long duration, 2

Persistence in adverse circumstances of time or weather, 2

Use of pitons or rappel slings already in place, 2 Carelessness in pulling down rope, 2 Weakness of party of two in glacier travel, 1 Numerous other contributory causes and circumstances in which carelessness or errors in judgment pre-dominated.

SIZE OF PARTY

Solo climber, 6 persons; two climbers, 18 parties; three, 11 parties; four, 5 parties; five, 4 parties; more than five, 7 parties; not stated or not pertinent, 15 parties

AGES OF CLIMBERS INVOLVED

15 to 20 years, 38 persons; climbers described as“ young” or“ college age”, 30 persons; 21 to 25 years, 13 persons; 26 to 30 years, 2 persons; 31 to 35 years, 4 persons; over 35 years, 3 persons; ages of other climbers not stated

AFFILIATIONS OF CLIMBERS INVOLVED

Unaffiliated, 26 parties; affiliations not stated (majority presumably unafiiliated), 18 parties; members of organized mountaineering clubs, 18 parties; members of informal climbing, hiking, or outdoor groups, 4 parties.

EXPERIENCE OF CLIMBERS INVOLVED

None or very little, 30 parties; experience not stated (majority presumably inexperienced), 18 parties; substantial, 18 parties

Study of the foregoing table brings out numerous points which may be of direct interest to climbing leaders and instructors in their efforts to decide upon the aspects of training and rules of safety which should be emphasized in classroom discussions, practice sessions, and actual climbs. It is evident from the table that the majority of accidents occurred during the descent, that a very large number of accidents could have been prevented or reduced in seriousness by the simple precautions of being adequately equipped and making more frequent use of the climbing rope, that solo climbing should be completely discouraged, that fewer accidents occurred to parties of three and four climbers than parties of two, and that the great, majority of climbers involved in accidents were inexperienced and unaffiliated persons between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five.

Special attention should be given to the fact, brought out by the above, that a very serious proportion of mountaineering accidents during the past five years occurred on snow and ice terrain. Twenty-one, or nearly one-third, of the sixty-six accidents analyzed occurred on snow and ice. Sixteen of the twenty-one accidents on snow resulted from simple slips or loss of control in a voluntary glissade. This proportion of accidents on snow appears far higher than normal or necessary for a type of climbing which, except mainly for that practiced in the Pacific Northwest, is essentially not snow and ice mountaineering. It strongly suggests that the danger of all steep snow-fields for inexperienced or inadequately equipped parties should receive the greatest possible emphasis in the training programs and safety rules of the regional climbing groups. Additional comments on this type of accident will be found in the detailed review of 1951 accidents.

Safety in mountaineering is fundamentally a matter of combining sound climbing technique with good judgment. The majority of experienced climbers regard proper belaying as a cornerstone of sound technique. Since World War II, important advances in the theory and practice of belaying the leader have been made in this country by Richard M. Leonard, Arnold Wexler and others, and in England by Kenneth Tarbuck and others. Recently, statements minimizing the value and effectiveness of these advancements in belaying technique have appeared in American and British mountaineering literature. Such expressions have taken the form of a restatement of the leader’s fundamental responsibility, - namely, that he must not fall. As an admonition to exercise the greatest care, this restatement is appropriate at any time. It is obvious, however, that the axiom does not always prevent falls. The fact that in some instances, the leader, no matter what the belayer does, may be injured or killed by striking rocks in a fall, does not constitute any argument for lessening all those precautions which a second on the rope can take. In many situations, unless the rope breaks, it is only by holding and stopping the leader’s fall that disastrous results for the remainder of the party can be prevented. Thus, the teaching of sound belaying technique, with particular emphasis on belaying the leader, should be continued among all climbing groups and should form an important part of a novice’s early training. Physical limitations largely determine the level of climbing skill attained by each individual in the time which he is able to devote to the practice of mountaineering, but all climbers can become expert rope handlers. This should be their aim and the goal of their teachers. Arguments minimizing the importance of belaying the leader ignore the psychological benefit of this conscious effort. A party making every effort to protect the leader in his advance is certainly more alert and aware of possible danger than it otherwise would be. On this vital subject, no less an authority than Mrs. Miriam E. Underhill has written:

"How to belay the leader, it seems to me, should be Lesson Number One in any course of instruction for guide- less climbers. Perhaps it is because this lesson is already taught by so many of our climbing clubs on this continent that we have so few disasters where the fall of the leader has pulled off the whole party. Personally, I am uneasy when I cannot belay the man above on a difficult pitch, no matter who he is."

The following pages present a review of accidents reported to us during the climbing season of 1951. As in previous reports, there is included also a short analysis of each, some general comments on related incidents and on regional safety efforts, and brief notes on accidents in other parts of North America.

This year we celebrate the Fiftieth Anniversary of the founding of the American Alpine Club. During this half century, the major initial explorations and ascents of North America’s mountains have largely been achieved. A new era of more technical and specialized mountaineering is now taking form and with it a more direct and vigorous emphasis on safety is required. It is, therefore, especially appropriate that this fifth and most gratifying report of our Committee is published in this anniversary year. It is our hope that these reports will provide a substantial basis for a continuing and increased attention to the tenets of alpine safety which the sane and healthy growth of American mountaineering demands.

Maynard M. Miller, Chairman

Ome Daiber (Seattle, Wash.)

Benjamin G. Ferris (Boston, Mass.)

John Fralick (Detroit, Mich.)

Hans Kraus (New York, N.Y.)

Richard M. Leonard (San Francisco, Cal.)

John de La Montagne (Laramie, Wyo.)