On February 4 at around 11:10 a.m., two skiers were caught by an avalanche in an area east of the Vail resort known locally as Marvin’s West or Big Marvin. This is a steep, east-facing slope below treeline that is dissected by two cliff bands in the avalanche start zone.

Skiers 1 and 2 had exited the Vail ski area through a backcountry access gate around 10:15 a.m. They hiked east for about 30 minutes and then descended along the ridgeline to the north to reach the top of the large, open bowl of Marvin’s West. They arrived at around 10:55 a.m.

Skier 1 made his way down through a series of cliff bands to a bench about 800 vertical feet below the ridge and waited there for Skier 2. The second skier began her descent and skied about 300 vertical feet, down to a narrow opening through a cliff band, and then triggered a large avalanche that broke above her. She tried to escape to the trees and managed to stay upright, and she came to a stop on the apron below the cliff band, buried to her knees in avalanche debris.

Skier 2 descended the debris field, observing that Skier 1 was not at their rendezvous point and that the avalanche had run well past the bench where he was supposed to be waiting. She switched her transceiver to receive and headed in the direction of the rendezvous point. Skier 2 located her partner and began digging. Skier 1 was found buried 2.5 to 3 feet deep. Skier 2 cleared the snow from around his head and shoulders. He was not breathing. This was about 10 minutes after the avalanche.

Skier 2 called Vail Ski Patrol at 11:20 a.m. to report the accident. Three other side-country tourers were riding in an area just east of Marvin’s West. They made their way to the scene, where they helped dig Skier 1 from the avalanche debris. One of the riders called Vail Ski Patrol, reported that CPR was in progress, and sent the dispatcher the coordinates. About an hour later, before patrollers could reach the scene, the skiers and riders decided that further resuscitation efforts would not be effective.

ANALYSIS

The Colorado Avalanche Information Center (CAIC) had issued an Avalanche Warning for the Vail/ Summit County zone at 6 a.m. on February 4, the day of the accident. The warning read, in part, “A foot or more of new snow and strong winds have combined to overload our fragile snowpack. Large, wide, and deadly avalanches will be very easy to trigger. Natural avalanches can run long distances.” CAIC’s forecast for this zone rated the avalanche danger at High near and above treeline and Considerable below treeline.

Extended periods of dry weather in November, December, and the first half of January had created a weak base for the snowpack. In the five days before the accident, about two feet of snow fell, including 12 inches in the 24 hours preceding the incident. Westerly to northwesterly winds had transported new snow to east-facing slopes throughout the night.

The soft slab avalanche unintentionally triggered by Skier 2 broke about two to three feet deep (into old snow layers). It was 700 feet wide and ran about 1,000 vertical feet. The slope angle was 38 degrees.

Skiers 1 and 2 made their plan  to  ski  Marvin’s West based on previous experience in the terrain. Skier 1 stopped in a place he felt was safe because he had never seen an avalanche run that far, and because it was a common rendezvous point for people who frequent the East Vail backcountry. Travel habits developed during usual conditions do not always work during periods when avalanches are breaking wider and running further than you have previously witnessed.

Vegetation and terrain can be more reliable than recent memory to determine safer areas. Look for the trim lines of the avalanche path—these are the areas where larger trees are still standing. You can also look for trees that are flagged, with all of the uphill branches ripped off by successive avalanches. In the area where Skier 1 was waiting, there are only small, sparse trees. The trim lines are far away, which means that historically avalanches have overrun this area. In the early 1990s, an avalanche here ran the entire way to the valley bottom and put debris on Interstate 70.

Safe travel techniques include regrouping outside of avalanche run-out zones, particularly when large avalanches are likely. In some situations, that may mean leap-frogging your partner in small sections, or deciding not to travel through a specific area because there are no safe places to regroup. In this particular avalanche path, there are not many safe places to stop and regroup, and it is not a safe place to be when the avalanche danger is Considerable. (Source: Colorado Avalanche Information Center.)

Read the full report from the Colorado Avalanche Information Center.