Terror Rock, Mountain Warfare on the Austro-Italian Front, 1915-16

Publication Year: 1944.

Terror Rock

Mountain Warfare on the Austro-Italian Front, 1915–16

Adams Carter

THE Punta dei Bos in the Dolomites is not a great peak rising proudly above its neighbors. It is only a buttress which juts out from the mightier Tofana I. Its 8715 ft. summit lies almost 1300 ft. below the highest peak of the group. But to the Italians it was the Castelletto the “Little Castle”; the Australians called it Schreckenstein, “Terror Rock.”

The tactical importance of Terror Rock was understood by the Austrians who quickly occupied it after the outbreak of hostilities with the Italians late in the spring of 1915. Jutting out into Italian territory, the peak overlooked the Dolomite highway as it climbed up from Cortina. From the cover of its rocky crags the Austrians could fire on the Italians as they advanced supplies and moved forward to their lines at the base of the peak. It gave the Austrians a perfect artillery observation post. So close were the lines that the men would shout across friendly greetings or curses depending on their mood. Yet they could not see each other. The enemies were separated by steep unclimbable cliffs, broken only by a single difficult gulley.

During July and August the Austrians made life hazardous for Italian troops in supply columns and in bivouac areas along the Dolomite highway. The Italians saw that they could not afford to leave the handful of Austrians in possession of their vital height. After careful planning the first move against the Austrians got under way. Skillful Alpini started the difficult climb up the narrow, steep gulley, but a falling rock gave them away. The Austrians lost no time in lobbing hand-grenades onto the cliffs. Flying steel and falling rocks soon drove the attackers back.

It seemed obvious that only flank attack would succeed. The Italians tried again. This time they traversed along the cliffs of Tofana I1 above Terror Rock, until they found a narrow shelf in the middle of the precipice overlooking the Austrian positions, less than 100 yards away. This ledge, which soon came to be called the “August Outpost,” they fortified with a steel shield. It was now the Italians who held the whip hand. No Austrian showed himself and lived to remember his indiscretion. But sniping alone was not enough. An Italian patrol was organized to climb down from the August Outpost at night. It would have been a difficult rock climb by day. Under the increased hazards of a night attack they were able to carry only hand grenades. Austrian salvos into the darkness hit some marks and drove the rest of the Italians back. One wounded Alpino lay helpless on the rocks between the opposing forces. For five days neither side could afford to heed his cries for help. During the fifth night the thud of his falling body indicated that his suffering was over.

The Italians captured the summit of Tofana I but this was of little help. It was impossible to descend the cliff above the August Outpost. Late in September the Italians decided on a more elaborate plan. A machine gun was to be carried to the August Outpost. This would keep the Austrians away from their positions on the Tofana side while an Alpini patrol was to attract the attention of the remaining Austrians by advancing towards the foot of Terror Rock on the other side. Meanwhile a patrol could climb the gulley on the third side undisturbed and capture the crag. The attempt was made but failed miserably because of bad timing. The machine gun arrived too late to be effective because of the incredible difficulty of climbing under the heavy load. The unsupported group in the gulley was easily repulsed with hand-grenades.

During the comparative inactivity of the winter of 1915–16 the Austrians made good use of their time to blast out caverns near the top of Terror Rock. Life was now much safer for the defenders. The Italians decided that the only way they could take the peak was to tunnel beneath the Austrian positions and to blow them up. A tunnel was to ascend almost 1000 ft. to a point under the col between Terror Rock and Tofana I and then to continue on to directly beneath the Austrian positions where the mine chamber would be placed. The total length would be over 1650 ft. To distract and maybe to mislead the Austrians, a second tunnel was to branch off and lead along inside the cliffs of Tofana I. At the last minute Italians could break down the walls of this tunnel just above the col and pour out to the attack. Slits might serve as observation points or loopholes. In January the Italian sappers began their work with rock drills and hammers. In March they started using machine drills. The hundred and twenty men made 15 to 20 ft. of progress every day.

A force of sixty or eighty Austrians was holding Terror Rock in the spring of 1916 with two machine guns and two mortars. An infantry cannon had been raised to the peak but there was no room to emplace it. By the time they were sure that their positions were being undermined, it was too late to blast out a tunnel parallel to the Italians’ for a counter-mine. All they could do was to sit on their powder keg and wait.

Because of a slight miscalculation, the Italians broke out by mistake onto the Tofana face from their branch tunnel on June 8th. This hole in the cliff, only 35 ft. from the nearest Austrian positions, was promptly sprayed by machine gun fire and hand-grenades. One grenade landed in the hole, but a quick-witted Italian threw it out again to explode harmlessly on the cliff below. A box of explosives was tossed in and this time exploded, killing one Italian. The dangerous gap was quickly blocked up.

The Austrians realized that they must investigate the situation further. Fähnrich Schneeberger and a non-commissioned officer silently climbed unarmed across the cliffs. They thought they saw an Italian outpost and discreetly retired. The next day they returned but were unable to carry more than pistols because of the difficulty of climbing. At the suspected point they saw an Alpino but the noise of cocking the pistol caught his attention. He ducked behind cover and again they had to return. That night the Italians strengthened this outpost from four to eleven men.

On the next day, June 14th, the weather favored the Austrians. Clouds and snow flurries hid their movements. As machine guns spat fire against Italian positions and approaches, Fähnrich Schneeberger and a patrol of seventeen men moved out across the steep face. They climbed the difficult rocks from one point of cover to the next, firing and themselves being fired at. Finally the patrol divided. Three men ascended perpendicularly. Others jumped to a ledge directly under the Italian outpost. From three sides they swarmed onto the ledge, where they met tough but ineffectual resistance. All the Italians were killed, wounded or captured. Two men of the patrol climbed farther until they were over the August Outpost but retired after lobbing hand-grenades onto the Italians below. An Italian counter-attack and artillery fire failed to drive out the Austrians. They built themselves positions on a nearby ridge, which came to be known as the “Schneeberger Outpost.”

The Italians strengthened their August Outpost. They reconnoitred the difficult cliffs and established themselves on a second point. From these outposts they sprinkled the Austrian positions with machine gun fire. Artillery fire was increased. By July 9th the Italians had completed loading their mine chamber. Seventy ft. below the Austrians lay 350 tons of high explosives, possibly the largest mine in the whole war. When the drilling stopped, the Austrians were no longer in doubt; they knew that they were very literally sitting on a powder keg.

The Italians set July 11th as the day to blow off the whole top of Terror Rock. A company of Alpini was to climb the gulley right after the explosion. Sappers would break out of the tunnel running along the Tofana face and emerge right above the saddle. Part were to attack and the rest to give supporting fire. Reinforcements would climb to the August Outpost to help support the attack.

On the night of July 10th King Victor Emmanuel, Chief-of- Staff Cadorna and others climbed a neighboring mountain to witness the great explosion. From their grandstand they heard adeafening blast, felt the earth tremble and watched the whole top of the peak rise with a brilliant flash and then settle slowly into its own crater. An artillery barrage thundered as the attackers advanced. It seemed impossible for anyone to have lived through the explosion.

Yet, by sheer good luck, few of the Austrians were killed or buried under the débris. It would still take a sharp attack to drive them from their shattered positions. Italian plans failed. The Alpini found the gulley littered with loose rocks and could not work their way up it. Poisonous gas filled the Tofana face tunnel. The tunnel windows were blocked with debris. Only the men climbing to the August Outpost managed to carry out their assignment.

The Austrians hung tenaciously to their now weak positions, taking what cover they could find in the crater and in the cliffs. Reinforcements were cut off. Artillery fire joined the mortar and rifle fire which was blasting them from the August Outpost. Italian snipers in the cliffs added to the murderous barrage. During the next night an Italian machine gun was raised into position. The Austrians were now covered on three sides. On the 12th the Schneeberger Outpost fell to a strong Italian patrol and from there the Italians advanced onto the saddle but were repulsed. Artillery fire increased its intensity. Alpini climbed the gulley and this time succeeded in reaching the top to capture the mine crater. On the morning of the 13th the Italians made openings in the Tofana tunnel from which two infantry cannon opened fire.

The Austrians now realized that the situation was hopeless. They could do nothing more than gain time in which to prepare better positions farther to the rear. They did manage to hold onto the northern edge of the peak for two weeks more and only withdrew after the beginning of a general Italian offensive.

1 Tofana I or Tofana di Roces (10,564 ft.) is the S. and lowest of three summits of the Tofana massif I which rises just N. of the Falzarego Pass on the main highway from Bolzano to Cortina. The Italians held the Tofana during 1915–17, while the Austrians occupied the Fanis across the Val Traven- zano immediately W.—Ed.